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Indiscriminate Punishment of Drug Users:
California Health and Safety Code
Section 11550
MICHAEL LEE PINKERTON*
If a man injures his neighbor, what he hath done must be done to
him: broken limb for broken limb, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. As
the injury inflicted, so must be the injury suffered.
-Leviticus 24:19-20
[O]ur ideas about and intervention in drug taking behavior have
only the most tenuous connection with the actual pharmacological
properties of "dangerous drugs".
-Thomas S. Szasz, M.D.'
Punishment is perhaps the most obvious form of coercive state action
imaginable. When the government imposes punishment, the convicted citi-
zen is directly confronted with the awesome power of the state. Depending
on the circumstances, the state may demand and obtain the offending
citizen's property, liberty or even life in retribution for a criminal act. There
are, however, definite constitutional limitations on the ability of the state to
* Deputy State Public Defender, Sacramento,California; B.A., 1973, University of
Colorado; J.D., 1976, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Member, State Bar
of California.
The author has appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the Office of the State Public
Defender in several appellate litigations involving California Health and Safety Code Section
11550. The author is indebted to Deputy State Public Defenders Mark E. Cutler and Richard E.
Shapiro, who provided guidance through discussions of the issues canvassed in this paper. The
assistance of Deputy State Public Defender Richard L. Phillips and Kristin M. Sudhoff, J.D.,
who each reviewed an earlier draft of the article, is also acknowledged.
1. T. SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS,
AND PUSHERS 169 (Anchor ed. 1975).
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punish. While most of the restrictions are procedural in nature, substantive
limitations do exist.
This article will review California Health and Safety Code Section 11550
in light of the substantive limitation contained in the "cruel and unusual"
punishment clause of the United States Constitution and the "cruel or
unusual" punishment provision of the California Constitution. 2 Both pro-
scriptions outlaw, inter alia, punishment that is disproportionate to the
crime. The precise thesis of the article is that the mandatory minimum
sentence 3 provision of Section 11550, 4 which proscribes the use of or being
under the influence of a wide variety pharmacological substances, 5 consti-
tutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of Article I, Section 17 of the
California Constitution.' The chief vice of the statute is that the 90-day
mandatory minimum sentence is applicable to an impermissibly wide array
of offenders and conduct without regard to the degree of danger the indi-
vidual criminal act poses to society and without regard to the culpability of
the individual offender.
The historic origin and subsequent judicial interpretation of the federal
clause will be examined first. This exegesis will reveal that the requirement
that punishment be proportionate to the crime is deeply embedded in English
common law and is thus an integral part of our legal tradition. The focus of
the article will then shift to the California Constitution. The independent
nature of the California charter will be touched upon by way of foundation
for the presentation of the state constitutional safeguard against dispropor-
tionate punishment. The state test to be used when determining whether a
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. I, §17.
3. For the purposes of this article, the term "mandatory minimum sentence" refers to a
sentence by which the defendant must be incarcerated for a given amount of time if he or she is
found guilty of the crime charged. Even where probation may be warranted, the granting of
probation must be conditioned on the service of the minimum period of incarceration.
4. No person shall use, or be under the influence of any controlled substance which
is (1) specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11054, specified in paragraph (11),
(12), or (17) of subdivision (d) of Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of
Section 11055, or (2) which is a narcotic drug classified in Schedule IIl, IV, or V
excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the
state to dispense, prescribe, or administer controlled substances. It shall be the burden
of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sen-
tenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail.
The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a period not to
exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a
condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jailfor at least 90 days. In
no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section
from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1407, §3, at 3031 (emphasis added).
5. See text accompanying notes 69-74 infra.
6. "Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive punishments im-
posed." CAL. CONsr. art. I, §17.
Although other constitutional theories, including equal protection, can be used to attack the
statute, they will not be discussed in this article. See Bosco v. Justice Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d
179, 143 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1978) (equal protection argument rejected). See also Comment,
California Health and Safety Code Section 11550: Is A Ninety Day Mandatory Minimum Jail
Term A Cruel or Unusual Punishment?, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 622 (1977).
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given punishment is disproportionate to the crime will then be applied to
Health and Safety Code Section 11550.
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF THE SOVEREIGN TO PUNISH:
HISTORIC ORIGIN AND ENSUING FEDERAL INTERPRETATION
The principle that punishment should not be disproportionate to the crime
is of ancient origin and was recognized in the laws of pre-Norman England. 7
Early English statutes embodied the concept8 and it was acknowledged in
the Magna Charta.9 The most significant codification of this precept in
relation to American Constitutional history occurred in the English Bill of
Rights. The year 1688 marked the end of the reign of the House of Stuart;
King James II was forced to abdicate the throne by William and Mary of
Orange. This coup d'etat came to be known as the "Glorious Revolu-
tion." 10 Parliament responded by passing a series of measures that compris-
ed the Revolutionary Settlement.1 The Bill of Rights was the principal
document of the Settlement.12 Among the enumerated abuses contained in
this document was a claim that "illegal and cruel punishments" had been
used. 13 Accordingly, it was declared that "cruel and unusual punishments"
should not be inflicted. 14
The American colonists included this proscription in several state charters
7. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 844 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Granucci].
8. Granucci, supra note 7, at 845.
9. 20. A free man shall not be fined for a small offence, except in proportion to the
measure of the offence; and for a great offence he shall be fined in proportion to the
magnitude of the offence .... and the villian shall be fined in the same way ....
21. Earls and barons shall only be fined by their peers, and only in proportion to their
offence.
22. A clergyman shall be fined like those before mentioned, only in proportion to his
lay holding, and not according to the extent of his ecclesiastical benefice.
G. ADAMS & H. STEPHENS, SELECT DOCUMENTS IN ENGLISH HISTORY, 45 (1916) [hereinafter
cited as G. ADAMS & H. STEPHENS].
10. M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 447-48 (1964). It has
also been referred to as the "great and glorious revolution." T. PLUCKNETIT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 59 (1956).
II. See G. ADAMS & H. STEPHENS, supra note 9, at 454-75, in which the documents
comprising the Revolutionary Settlement are collected.
12. 1 W&M 2, c.2; see G. ADAMS & H. STEPHENS, supra note 9, at 462-69.
[The Bill of Rights] listed most of the faults of which Parliament considered the Stuart
monarchs guilty, and settled the crown on William and Mary on the understanding that
those misdeeds were not to be repeated.
M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 449 (1964).
13. Whereas the late king James the Second by the assistance of divers evil counsel-
lors, judges and ministers employed by him did endeavor to subvert and extirpate the
Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of our kingdom .... And excessive
fines have been imposed. And illegal and cruel punishments have been inflicted.
G. ADAMS & H. STEPHENS, supra note 9, at 463.
14. And thereupon the said lords spiritual and temporal and commons pursuant to
their respective letters and elections being now assembled in a full and free representa-
tion of this nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for
attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like cases have
usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties,
declare: . . .That excessive bail might not be required nor excessive fines imposed
nor cruel or unusual punishments ... inflicted.
Id. at 464-65.
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that were enacted before the United States Constitution. 15 Virginia was the
first, and eight other states followed suit. 16 It was also a part of the
Northwest Ordinance, and was included in the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1791.17 Early American judicial interpretations
of this constitutional prohibition shifted away from the English concept of
disproportionality, concentrating instead on the mode of punishment inflict-
ed. 18 Thus, one writer maintained:
Following adoption, state and federal jurists accepted the view
that the clause prohibited certain methods of punishments. Since
barbarities of Stuart England were not often used in America, the
clause was rarely invoked in the courts. Attempts to extend the
meaning of the clause to cover any punishment disproportionate
to the crime were rebuffed throughout the nineteenth century and
commentators believed the clause to be obsolete.19
In 1910 a safeguard against disproportionate punishment was read into the
eighth amendment by the United States Supreme Court in Weems v. United
States.20 In that case the Supreme Court invalidated a Philipine statute that
punished a white-collar crime with a fine, a minimum of twelve years at
hard labor, and serious perpetual civil collateral consequences which for
practical purposes amounted to civil death. 21 This punishment was found to
be impermissibly disproportionate because more serious crimes were less
severely punished under the United States and Phillipine Codes. 22 Also
mentioned was a similar federal crime that was less severely punished. 23
The Weems decision was supported by two lines of reasoning. The
majority reasoned that although the Framers may have been primarily
concerned with banning the barbaric forms of punishment that existed in
seventeenth century England, they must also have intended to prohibit other
sorts of punishment.24 Thus if a punishment violates society's evolved sense
of decency, it would be unconstitutional even though it may not be an
inherently barbaric or cruel mode of punishment. The majority also declared
that the Constitution is not a document of fixed meaning:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of
wider application than the mischief that gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions. 25
15. Granucci, supra note 7, at 840. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 393-94
(1910) (dissenting opinion).
16. Granucci, supra note 7, at 839-40.
17. Granucci, supra note 7, at 840.
18. Granucci, supra note 7, at 839-42.
19. Granucci, supra note 7, at 842.
20. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
21. Id. at 381-82.
22. Id. at 380-81.
23. Id. at 380.
24. Id. at 372-75.
25. Id. at 373.
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Thus it was deemed necessary and proper to evaluate the proportionality
aspect of the cruel and unusual punishment clause in terms of contemporary
social mores. 26 Although thus firmly established, the concept of propor-
tionality was not vigorously applied by the courts. For some time legislative
judgments regarding the appropriateness of a penalty were left largely
undisturbed. 27 In the past twenty years, however, the Supreme Court has
exhibited renewed interest in the proportionality test. In Coker v. Georgia28
the Court revitalized and refined the proportionality requirement.
In Coker, the defendant had escaped from a Georgia state prison where he
was serving sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping and aggravated assault.
His activities during the time he was at liberty resulted in convictions for
escape, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping and rape. In the sentencing phase of
his subsequent trial the jury applied an aggravation statute and fixed the
penalty on the rape conviction at death. The Court was thus presented with
an issue that was not before it in the recent capital cases of Furman v.
Georgia29 or Gregg v. Georgia3 --namely: Can the death penalty be
imposed on a person who has not been convicted of murder? The scope of
the decision was stated early in the opinion: The death penalty is not cruel
and unusual punishment per se because it is not "inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always dispropor-
tionate to the crime for which it is imposed.''31 According to Mr. Justice
White, writing for the majority and joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun
and Stevens, a penalty is cruel and unusual if it does not measurably
contribute to a valid penological goal. 32 Such punishment would amount to
nothing more than the gratuitous infliction of pain and suffering.
A second method acknowledged by the majority for testing constitutional-
ity in this context is an inquiry into whether the punishment "is grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime." 33 The Court then engaged in an
historical and comparative approach in applying this criterion of propor-
tionality. The laws of the other states were consulted to determine how
many, both presently and within the past 50 years, prescribed death for rape
of an adult woman. This survey revealed that within the last half century,
the states making rape a capital crime were in a distinct minority. 34 Contem-
porary mores, expressed through present punishment provisions pointed
even more convincingly toward the unconstitutionality of the Georgia stat-
ute. Georgia was found to be "the sole jurisdiction in the United States at
26. Id. at 373-75.
27. Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual
Ptnishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 848 (1961).
28. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
29. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
30. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
31. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977).
32. Id. at 592.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 593.
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the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is
an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions. provide capital punish-
ment when the victim is a child." 35
The indisputably serious nature of the crime of rape was considered next.
The Court conceded that:
[Rape] is highly reprehensible in both a moral sense and in its
almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of
the female victim and for the latter's priviledge of choosing those
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of
homicide it is the "ultimate violation of self."
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but
• . .it does not compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life. 36
Mr. Justice White then concluded that "the death penalty, which 'is
unique in its severity and [irrevocability],' . . . is an excessive penalty for
the rapist who, as such, does not take human life." 37 As a final note the
Court pointed out that according to Georgia law, the more serious crime of
murder is not punishable by death unless specific aggravating factors are
found. This meant that in certain circumstances a rapist would be more
severely punished than a murderer. This anomaly was "difficult" for the
Court to accept. 38
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that although the proportionality
requirement has been received and applied unevenly by the Supreme Court
over the years, it is again becoming an important and viable constitutional
safeguard. It should also be noted that the English principle of propor-
tionality was broad and not originally intended to limit the mode of punish-
ment inflicted, but to insure that the punishment imposed was not excessive.
This made even the judicial review of fines possible. 39
The United States Supreme Court has never declared that a punishment
violates the eighth amendment solely because of the length of the assigned
period of incarceration. The California courts, however, have invalidated
excessively long sentences on the basis of the "cruel or unusual punish-
ment" provision of the California Constitution. In a series of cases begin-
ning in 1972 with In re Lynch, 4° the California Supreme Court developed a
multifaceted test that limits the period of incarceration to a length that is
35. Id. at 595-96. A further indication of contemporary societies' ethical view that death is
an inappropriate sanction for rape was found in the fact that in over 90 percent of the cases in
which Georgia juries had the opportunity to impose the death penalty, they refused to do so. Id.
at 597.
36. Id. at 597-98.
37. Id. at 598. The Court was unimpressed by the fact that under the statute the death
penalty could only be imposed if specific aggravating factors were found because none of the
factors involved the death of the victim. Id. at 598-99.
38. Id. at 600.
39. The writ de moderata misercordia developed as a mechanism to enforce the Magna
Charta's prohibition against excessive fines. Granucci, supra note 7, at 846.
40. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
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proportionate to the crime. 41 Because the standard applied by the California
courts will reach sentences that are beyond the purview of the federal
criterion, it is necessarily based on the California rather than the United
States Constitution.42 Although the state criterion is more exacting than its
federal counterpart, it is fully consonant with its English antecedent and thus
possesses considerable historical integrity. After a brief discussion of the
independent nature of the state charter, this state test for determining when a
sentence is disproportionate will then be developed and applied to California
Health and Safety Code Section 11550. A recent intermediate appellate
court case which considered this issue will also be critically reviewed.
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CALIFORNIA STANDARD:
INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
The notion that the rights embodied in the California Constitution are
independent of those contained in the federal charter has both historic and
analytic underpinnings. In 1849, when the Constitution of California was
adopted, the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.43 Therefore,
out of practical necessity, the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights
in California could not have been intended to be dependent upon the
guarantees in the United States Constitution. Additionally, the available
historic data suggests that the authors of the Declaration of Rights were
heavily influenced by the charters of other states. 44
Considerations of federalism provide the analytic basis for the indepen-
dence of state constitutions. Although the United States Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions, 45 that jurisdiction "rests
entirely on the existence of what is always referred to as a 'federal question'
in the case. "46 This of course means that state judiciaries are free to interpret
state laws protecting individual rights more liberally than analogous federal
provisions have been interpreted. 47 This principle is explicitly recognized in
41. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
42. Id.
43. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
44. R. HUNT, THE GENESIS OF CALIFORNIA'S FIRST CONSTITUTION 55-60 (1895); Falk, The
State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273,283
(1973) citing C. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE
FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OcTOBER 1849, at 24, 31, 221
(1850).
45. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
46. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 482 (1970). See also Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 n.80 (1977):
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state cases is limited to the correction of errors
related solely to questions of federal law. It cannot review state court determinations
of state law even when the case also involves federal issues. Murdock v. City of
Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Moreover, if a state ground is independent
and adequate to support a judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction at all over the
decision despite the presence of federal issues. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207
(1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
47. As Mr. Justice Brennan has observed:
mhe decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and should not be,
dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
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the state constitution itself,4 8 and in provisions of California statutes. 49
The California Supreme Court, along with the highest court of several
other states,"0 has taken an active role in promoting this brand of federalism.
On many notable occasions the California High Court has rejected and
expanded upon the prevailing federal interpretation of a constitutional safe-
guard, resting its holding on the state constitution. 51 In People v. Disbrow,5 2
a case involving the right against self-incrimination, the California Supreme
Court explicitly relied upon the state charter in the face of contrary federal
authority. 53 In so doing, the court articulated the independence of the
California Constitution:
We declare that [the contrary holding of the United States Su-
preme Court] is not persuasive authority in any state prosecution
in California . . . . We pause . . . to reaffirm the independent
nature of the California Constitution and our responsibility to
separately define and protect the rights of California citizens
despite conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the federal Constitution." 54
The independent state grounds doctrine has been relied upon by the
California Supreme Court in its interpretation of the "cruel or unusual
punishment" clause of Article I, Section 17. 55 In one line of cases, the court
has developed a test that restricts the permissible period of incarceration to a
length of time that is proportionate to the crime. This body of case law will
now be analyzed and applied to Health and Safety Code Section 11550.
law. Accordingly, such decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues,
and state court judges and members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
502 (1977).
48. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §24 reads in part: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not
dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
49. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1204:
A statement that is otherwise admissible as hearsay evidence is inadmissible against
the defendant in a criminal action if the statement was made, either by the defendant
or by another, under such circumstances that it is inadmissible against the defendant
under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California (emphasis
added).
50. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975); Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State
Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973).
51. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972);
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); Cardenas v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657(1961). See generally Falk, supra note 44,
at 278-79 n.18.
52. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
53. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1970).
54. 16 Cal. 3d at 113-15, 345 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
55. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972)
(outlawed capital punishment on state constitutional grounds), superseded by CAL. CONST. art.
1, §27.
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THE 90-DAY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE PROVISION OF CALIFORNIA
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 11550 AND THE STATE PROHIBITION
AGAINST CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A. The Basic Constitutional Limitation: In re Lynch
In In re Lynch 56 the Supreme Court of California announced the test for
determining whether a punishment is so disproportionate to the crime that it
constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of Article I, Section 17
of the state constitution. 57 Mr. Justice Mosk, writing for five other members
of the court, first acknowledged the doctrine of separation of powers and
reaffirmed the well-established precept that "in our tripartite system of
government it is the function of the legislative branch to define crimes and
prescribe punishments, and that such questions are in the first instance for
the judgment of the Legislature alone." 58 The complementary role of the
judiciary in this system of checks and balances is to subject legislative
judgments to the litmus of the constitution. Thus, although "[t]he Legisla-
ture is . . . accorded the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal
statutes and in specifying punishment for crime, . . . the final judgment as
to whether the punishment it decrees exceeds constitutional limits is a
judicial function." 59 To strike the proper balance in this constitutional
division of labor "[sitatutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality
clearly, positively and unmistakably appears.''60
After the decision was thus placed into proper context, the standard for
determining whether a punishment is disproportionate was announced. 61
First, the nature of the offense and the offender should be examined. The
primary focus of this investigation should be the degree of danger the
offense and offender present to society. The later case of In re Foss62 stated
for the first time that the penological purposes of the punishment should also
be taken into consideration in this regard. Second, after this assessment is
made, a comparison should be made between the challenged punishment
and punishments levied in the same jurisdiction for more serious crimes.
56. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
57. For detailed commentary on Lynch and those cases following, see Comment, Califor-
nia's Cruelty Criteria: Evaluating Sentences After In re Lynch, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 636 (1974);
Comment, Prohibiting Cruel or Unusual Punishment: California's Requirement of Proportionate
Sentencing After Wingo and Rodriquez, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 524 (1976).
58. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 414, 503 P.2d 921, 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1972)
(emphasis added), citing People v. Bauer, I Cal. 3d 368, 375, 461 P.2d 637, 641, 82 Cal. Rptr.
357, 361 (1968); People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 181, 217 P.2d 1, 4 (1950); People v. Tanner, 3
Cal. 2d 279, 298, 44 P.2d 324, 332 (1935).
59. 8 Cal. 3d at 414, 503 P.2d at 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (emphasis added), quoting
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 640, 493 P.2d 880, 888, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 160 (1972).
60. 8 Cal. 3d at 415,503 P.2d at 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 219, quoting In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.
2d 444, 453, 450 P.2d 296, 301, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1969).
61. The Lynch test is by no means novel. The supreme court relied heavily upon authority
from foreign jurisdictions when it devised the basic framework that is used to determine
constitutionality vel non in this context.
62. 10 Cal. 3d 410, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
Finally, the challenged penalty should be compared with that imposed in
other states for committing the same or similar crime. 63
This multi-faceted test appears to be a well-balanced approach to a
delicate judicial function. Even though the first prong might be subject to
attack as inviting an individual judge to read his or her subjective views on
the wisdom of the challenged penalty into the constitution, the latter two
components insure a degree of objectivity by utilizing a comparative analy-
sis. One of the most outstanding virtues of the Lynch criteria is its versatility.
Subsequent cases have applied the comparative proportionality test to
minimum 64 as well as maximum sentences. 65 The mandatory minimum
sentence provision of California Health and Safety Code Section 11550 will
now be examined in light of Lynch and its progeny.
B. The Nature of the Offense and the Offender
1. The Nature of the Offense
The most salient feature of Health and Safety Code Section 11550 is the
fact that a great variety of conduct comes within its ambit.66 This is a critical
factor in determining the constitutionality of an assigned penalty. The
broader the scope of a statute that prescribes a mandatory minimum period
of incarceration the more constitutionally suspect it becomes because it
eschews consideration of the particular criminal act or of individual culpa-
bility. 67 As the California Supreme Court has noted when discussing the
suspect nature of other provisions of the Health and Safety Code dealing
with controlled substances:
[T]here is one pertinent characteristic shared by each of the nar-
cotics recidivist provisions of the Health and Safety Code: each
such provision proscribes a broad range of conduct. . . . More
significant for purposes of our analysis, the mandatory prison
terms prior to parole eligibility prescribed for each offense are
automatically enhanced by the findings of one or more prior
convictions of specified narcotics offenses which cover an even
broader spectrum of conduct. .... (s
The statute under consideration contains a defect similar to these recidiv-
ist provisions. Section 11550 incorporates several other sections of the
Health and Safety Code. 69 These incorporated sections list pharmacological
63. 8 Cal. 3d at 427, 503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
64. See, e.g., In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1,553 P.2d590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430(1976); Inre Foss,
10 Cal. 3d 910,519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); In re Williams, 69 Cal. App. 3d 840, 138
Cal. Rptr. 384 (1977).
65. See In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
66. See text accompanying notes 68-75 infra.
67. See generally In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 553 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976); People
v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169,534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97(1975); Inre Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,503
P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
68. In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d at 9-10, 553 P.2d at 596, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
69. Although it is clear that other sections of the Health and Safety Code are incorporated
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substances as diverse as heroin, 70 tetrahydrocannabinol (the active ingredient
in marijuana), 71 codeine (a pain reliever),72 and mescaline (an hallucino-
gen). 73 A more diverse group of drugs is hard to imagine.74 Yet the statute
treats them all the same. These drugs have a wide range of effect upon the
human body; the only quality they share is legislative regulation of their
usage under Section 11550.
Also material is the fact that the section does not require that there be any
measurable or perceptible intoxicating effect upon the user. 75 This law does
not distinguish between one who is rendered incapacitated by ingesting a
controlled substance and one who has taken a pharmacologically insignifi-
cant dosage and remains unaffected. These two cases are polar opposites
that demand different treatment since enormously different threats to society
are presented, yet no such distinctions are made in the mandatory minimum
sentence provision of Health and Safety Code Section 11550.
2. The Nature of the Offender
The notion of a typical offender of Health and Safety Code Section 11550
is as mercurial a concept as the "typical offense." Due to the panoramic
scope of the substances regulated by the statute a violator may be one who
takes one pain pill that was prescribed to another or the violator may be a
morphine addict who injects the substance several times daily. Although it
cannot be seriously argued that these two offenders are equally deserving of
punishment, the statute absurdly lumps the addict and nonaddict together
and treats them in a singular fashion. Such a practice is impermissible, and
the inability of Section 11550 to make such a critical distinction is strong
evidence of its unconstitutional nature. 76 The constitutional vice of such a
by Section 11550, deciding exactly which pharmacological agents listed in the incorporated
sections are actually regulated by Section 11550 is another matter. See Bosco v. Justice Court,
77 Cal. App. 3d 179, 184 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472-73 n.6 (1978).
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11054(c)(10).
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11054(d)(17).
72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11056(d).
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1 1054(d)(i 1).
74. What are commonly referred to as "narcotic drugs" consist of a great variety of
substances, with different properties and with varying degrees of habit-forming
characteristics. Narcotics are defined in the dictionary as substances that induce
sleep, dull the senses, and relieve pain. In law, the president's crime commission
recently noted, the term "has been given artificial meaning." It does not refer, as
might be expected, to one class of drugs encompassing substances with similar
chemical properties or pharmacological effects. It is applied, rather, to a number of
different classes of drugs that have been grouped together for convenience and for
purposes of legal control. These typically include the opiates, cocaine, and marijuana.
N. KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 217-18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as N. KIITRIE].
75. Section 11550 of the Health and Safety Code prohibits the mere use of the incor-
porated controlled substances. Contrast this to other legislative provisions that require an
ascertainable level of intoxication. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §647(f) (drunk in public); CAL.
VEH. CODE §23101 (felony drunk driving); CAL. VEH. CODE §23102(a) (misdemeanor drunk
driving); CAL. VEH. CODE §23105 (misdemeanor driving under the influence of drugs); CAL.
VEH. CODE §23106 (felony driving under the influence of drugs).
76. Cf. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 653, 537 P.2d 384, 394, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 562
(1975) (failure of the Adult Authority to distinguish between its term-fixing responsibility and its
parole-granting function is unconstitutional).
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legislative arrangement is further highlighted when the penological purposes
of punishment are considered.
3. The Penological Purposes of the Prescribed Punishment
Jurisprudential discussions of the purpose and function of penal sanctions
generally focus on four general theories; rehabilitation, isolation, deter-
rence, and retribution. 77 All theories have one thing in common: each
contains definite limits on the extent to which punishment can legitimately
be imposed.
The positivist school of penology maintains that punishment should be
utilized to reform the offender and to isolate him or her from society during
the reformation process. 78 From this perspective punishment is permissible
only until the offender is reformed or is no longer a danger to society.
Because of the problems inherent in predicting dangerousness, 79 and the
lack of actual ability to reform offenders, the nature of the offense is a major
factor to consider when setting the limits of permissible punishment. 80 The
deterrence theory of punishment is based on utilitarian assumptions. If the
punishment inflicted is "painful" enough to outweigh the "pleasure"
derived from the commission of the unlawful act, then crime will be
prevented by deterring members of society (general deterrence) and the
particular offender (special deterrence). 8I In all instances, the punishment
should be great enough to bring about deterrence, but no greater. 82 Classical
retribution theory holds that punishment is imposed for purposes of revenge
or expiation. 83 Strict limitations on punishment obtain from this theoretical
77. See generally H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
The social sciences provide alternative perspectives from which the phenomenon of punish-
ment can be fruitfully studied. Professor Hermann's review of this literature contains a concise
summary of the major theoretical positions. Hermann, The Evil Christ Crucified: The Ritual
Function of Punishment, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1909 (1973).
Thomas S. Szasz, M.D. has incisively analyzed the political, moral and sociological implica-
tions of the legal regulation of drug related activity from a libertarian perspective. T. SZASZ,
CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS AND PUSHERS (Anchor
ed. 1975).
78. N. KITrRIE, supra note 74, at 24-39.
79. See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439,
440 (1974) in which Dr. Diamond states:
Can psychiatrists predict danger with reasonable accuracy? Are there well established
clinical symptoms which, if present, can be relied upon to indicate potential danger?
Can one be reasonably sure that persons who are not dangerous will not be labeled as
such and unnecessarily confined? I believe the answer to all these questions is an
emphatic "no."
80. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 54 (1968).
81. Hermann, The Evil Christ Crucified: The Ritual Function of Punishment, 19 WAYNE
L. REV. 1409, 1420-21 (1973).
82. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 182
(Hafner edition 1948):
The last object is, whatever mischief is guarded against, to guard against it at as cheap
a rate as possible: therefore The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is
necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given. (emphasis in original).
83. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 33-39 (1968).
The appropriateness of considering the penological purposes of punishment in conjunction
with this aspect of the Lynch test was first suggested in In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 919-20, 519
P.2d 1073, 1078, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (1974). At that time the court did not discuss
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stance. It "should be proportionate to the crime committed and must not
become excessive. " 84
Proper application of all of the above penological theories require that
punishment be tailored with reference to the individual criminal act. It is
precisely in this regard that the punishment provision of Health and Safety
Code Section 11550 fails. It seems obvious that the m6lange of offenders
and behavior that falls within the purview of this code section does not
present a uniform degree of danger to society, nor are they singularly
culpable and deserving of punishment. To lump such a mixed bag of persons
and activities together can not serve a valid penological purpose, but can
only "shock the conscience" of a fair-minded person.85
C. The Mandatory Minimum Sentence Provision of Health and Safety
Code Section 11550 Compared to the Minimum Penalty Imposed for
More Serious Crimes in California
The second prong of the Lynch analysis, which requires comparison with
punishment for more serious crimes, was elucidated by the Foss court in the
following manner:
The second technique. . . involves a comparison of the ques-
tioned punishment with punishments imposed within the same
jurisdiction for offenders which may be deemed more serious than
that for which the questioned punishment is imposed. . . . [The
vast majority of punishments . . . may . . . be deemed illustra-
tive of constitutionally permissible degrees of severity; and if
among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely
than the offense in question, the challenged penalty is to that
extent suspect. 86
One of the most striking features of the punishments prescribed in the
California codes is the almost total lack of provisions for mandatory incar-
ceration. The possibility of straight probation with no time served stands as
the rule almost without exception.87 The exceptional circumstances in which
a minimum sentence must be served constitute a narrow course of conduct
that is inherently dangerous to others.8 8 This stands in contrast to the
panoply of victimless conduct embraced by California Health and Safety
Code Section 11550. A brief canvas of the codes will reveal that the 90-day
retribution. The California Legislature, however, has recently emphasized this factor in its new
determinate sentencing scheme. CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(a)(l) which provides in part: "The
Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment." In
this context the term "punishment" should be read as "retribution." See generally Cassou &
Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 PAc. L.J. 1 (1978);
Smith & Newcomb, California's Determinate Sentence Law: The "Final" Version, 4 ORANGE
C.B.J. 280 (1977).
84. N. KrrrIu, supra note 74, at 21.
85. See 8 Cal. 3d at 425, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
86. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 920, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (1974).
87. See text accompanying notes 88-91 and 93-96 infra.
88. See text accompanying notes 92 & 97 infra.
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minimum sentence provision under discussion is an isolated excessive
penalty and thus constitutionally suspect.
1. Nondrug Related Felonies
The most serious nondrug related felonies are, of course, those designated
as "violent felonies." These violent felonies are: murder or voluntary
manslaughter; mahem; forcible rape as defined in subdivisions (2), (3) and
(4) of Penal Code Section 261; sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace
or threat of great bodily harm; kidnapping as defined in Penal Code Section
209; lewd acts on a child under 14 as defined in Penal Code Section 288;
and any other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on
persons other than accomplices. 89 Despite the fact that the legislature has
singled out these crimes to receive enhanced punishment "to display soci-
ety's condemnation for such extraordinary crimes of violence against the
person,"9 the perpetrator of any of these crimes is still eligible for straight
probation. 91 The same is true of other serious felonies such as robbery or
burglary. 92 This of course does not mean that the perpetrator will be granted
straight probation; it does mean, however, that the offender has the right to
be considered for probation. In so considering, the sentencing judge will
then take into account factors of the individual offense-something that is
not allowed by Health and Safety Code Section 11550.
Contrast the above to the situation in which one uses a firearm during the
commission of certain specified felonies. When this occurs the defendant is
not eligible for probation. 93 A mandatory sentence is thus reserved for
89. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c).
91. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203. A group of criminal acts are singled out in subdivision(d) of
Section 1203 of the Penal Code. Those who perpetrate the acts enumerated in that subsection
are still eligible for probation, but the sentencing judge must find that justice would best be
served by such a disposition. When probation is granted under these circumstances, the court
must specify the reasons for the finding. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203(e). Thus, even those
defendants falling within the scope of subdivision (d) receive the benefit of being considered for
probation.But see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.08 (recidivist provision); 1203.09 (violent crimes
against aged or disabled persons).
92. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.
93. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.06 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203:
(a) Probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of
sentence be suspended for, any of the following persons:
(1) Any person who used a firearm during the commission or attempted commis-
sion of any of the following crimes:
(i) Murder.(ii) Assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Section 217.
(iii) Robbery, in violation of Section 211.(iv) Kidnapping, in violation of Section 207.
(v) Kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or robbery, in violation of Section 209.
(vi) Burglary of the first degree, as defined in Section 460.
(vii) Rape by force or violence, in violation of subdivision (2) of Section 261.
(viii) Rape by threat of great and immediate bodily harm in violation of subdivision
(3) of Section 261.
(ix) Assault with intent to commit rape, the infamous crime against nature, or
robbery, in violation of Section 220.
(x) Escape, in violation of Section 4530, or Section 4532.
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extraordinary crimes where, due to the use of a firearm, the offense was
perpetrated in a particularly life-endangering fashion.
2. Drug related felonies
The same type of sentencing structure that was described above for
nondrug related felonies also holds true in the case of drug-related felonies.
This is perhaps best illustrated by examining the felony provisions relating
to the same substances controlled by Health and Safety Code Section 11550.
One may feloniously possess, 94 feloniously possess for sale, 95 or feloniously
sell, 96 agents covered by Section 11550. These crimes are certainly more
serious than the misdemeanor violation of Section 11550, and yet commis-
sion of these crimes still does not subject the offender to a mandatory
minimum period of incarceration. 
97
As in the case of nondrug related felonies, the legislature has carved out a
narrow exception to the general precept of probation eligibility. The excep-
tion deals with possession for sale, or sale of one-half ounce or more of
heroin, or for offenders who have been convicted more than once of
possession for sale of heroin. These persons cannot be considered for
probation. 98
(2) Any person previously convicted of a felony specified in subparagraphs (i)
through (x) of paragraph (1), who is convicted of a subsequent felony and who was
armed with a firearm at the time of his arrest for the subsequent felony.
(b)(1) The existence of any fact which would make a person ineligible for proba-
tion under subdivision (a) shall be alleged in the information or indictment, and either
admitted by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the jury trying the
issue of guilt or by the court where guilt is established by plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or by trial by the court sitting without a jury.
(2) This subdivision does not prohibit the adjournment of criminal proceedings
pursuant to Division 3 (commencing with Section 3000) or Division 6 (commencing
with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(3) As used in subdivision (a) "used a firearm" means to display a firearm in a
menacing manner, to intentionally fire it, or to intentionally strike or hit a human being
with it.
(4) As used in subdivision (a) "armed with a firearm" means to knowingly carry a
firearm as a means of offense or defense."
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11350.
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11351.
96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11352.
97. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.
98. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.07 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203, probation shall not be granted
to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any of the
following persons:
(I) Any person who is convicted of violating Section 11351 of the Health and
Safety Code by possessing for sale one-half ounce or more of a substance containing
heroin.
(2) Any person who is convicted of violating Section 11352 of the Health and
Safety Code by selling or offering to sell one-half ounce or more of a substance
containing heroin.
(3) Any person convicted of violating Section 11351 of the Health and Safety Code
by possessing heroin for sale or convicted of violating Section 11352 of the Health and
Safety Code by selling or offering to sell heroin, and who has one or more prior
convictions for violating Section 11351 or Section 11352 of the Health and Safety
Code.
(b) The existence of any fact which would make a person ineligible for probation
of subdivision (a) shall be alleged in the information or indictment, and either admitted
by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the jury trying the issue of guilt
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3. Analysis
Both the general rule of probation availability and the exceptions to the
rule highlight the unreasonable nature of the sentencing provision of Health
and Safety Code Section 11550. The vast majority of offenders, even those
convicted of violent crimes, are entitled to have the individual factors of the
particular criminal act considered by the sentencing judge. This is impossi-
ble under Health and Safety Code Section 11550 because, although proba-
tion may be granted to an offender, it must be conditioned on service of a
90-day jail sentence.
The few provisions of the codes that preclude parole consideration also
confirm the suspect nature of Health and Safety Code Section 11550. In
both the exceptions cited above, 99 a very specific type of criminal conduct is
singled out for special treatment. In contrast, Health and Safety Code
Section 11550 encompasses an enormously wide variety of conduct that
does not present a uniform degree of danger to society. The inequity
resulting from this incongruous sentencing structure is apparent. The perpet-
rator of the most serious, violent crimes in California has the right to be
judged as an individual offender and considered for straight probation while
the nonviolent offender of Health and Safety Code Section 11550 faces a
mandatory period of incarceration without consideration of the individual
criminal act. Disparity of this order is intolerable in a civilized system of
criminal justice.
D. The Mandatory Minimum Sentence Provision of Health and Safety
Code Section 11550 Compared to the Minimum Sentence Imposed in
Other Jurisdictions for Similar Crimes
Like the preceeding two parts of the Lynch test, the third Lynch prong
points unwaveringly toward the unconstitutionality of the minimum sen-
tence under consideration. Only twelve states in the Union other than
California make it a crime to use or be under the influence of a controlled
substance. 1° Of these, only Arizona has a mandatory minimum sentence
provision.101 "Thus it is the virtually unanimous judgment of our sister
states that [drug use] . . . can be adequately controlled [without a manda-
tory minimum sentence]. In this setting the California penalty. . . strikes a
or by the court where guilt is established by plea of guilty or nolo contendere or by trial
by the court sitting without a jury.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.06, 1203.07.
100. ALASKA STAT. tit. 17, §12.110(d) (Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §36-1062 (1974);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-184 (Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, §4753 (Supp. 1977); MicH. COMP.
LAWS §335.341(5) (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. tit. 40, §453.441 (19-); N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:21-
20(b), (c) (West Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2925.11 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, §2-405 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. §167.217 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 58, §37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. tit. 35, §7-1039 (1977).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §36-1062 (1974). Even in Arizona, however, the trial court may
suspend the sentence if the defendant is a first-time offender and undergoes treatment. ARIz.
REV. STAT. §36-1062.02E (1974).
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discordant note indeed."' 2 Health and Safety Code Section 11550 is thus
revealed as an isolated example of disproportionate punishment when
viewed on a national level.
A recent intermediate appellate court decision dealing with the constitu-
tionality of Section 11550 will be considered next. An analysis of that
opinion reveals that the court did not examine most of the issues presented
above in any depth. The approach used by the court was to characterize the
statute so it did not seem to embrace such a wide variety of conduct and
pharmacological substances. After this shallow examination Section 11550
was found to be constitutional.
E. Bosco v. Justice Court: A Misapplication of Lynch
The California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District recently considered
the constitutionality of the 90-day mandatory sentence provision of Section
11550. In Bosco v. Justice Court'03 Mr. Justice Hopper applied what he
characterized as a Lynch analysis and concluded that the mandatory
minimum sentence was constitutional. Although the court summarily
conceded that the second and third prongs of the Lynch test indicated that
the statute was constitutionally suspect, it nevertheless upheld the blanket
penalty based on its construction of the first Lynch prong.
The main thrust of the court's treatment of the first Lynch factor was that
any person who should not be subjected to the mandatory minimum penalty
would be saved by the manner in which the statute is administered. The
court reasoned that when an unsuitable case is presented it would either not
be prosecuted, or the trial court would dismiss the complaint if filed.104 In
lieu of this, the court asserted that statutory diversion105 or a California
Rehabilitation Center commitment' °6 would factor out those who should not
receive the 90-day sentence, even though they literally fall within the reach
of the statute. 107
When the penological purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence were
considered, the court spoke as if Section 11550 dealt exclusively with
addicting substances.108 According to the Bosco court, it could not be said
that the goals of deterrence and rehabilitation were not served by the
mandatory sentence. 109 Thus, on the basis of an indication of constitutionali-
ty on the first prong of the Lynch test and unconstitutionality on the second
and third aspects of the test, the court found the statute to be valid.
102. 8 Cal. 3d at 436, 503 P.2d at 938-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
103. 77 Cal. App. 3d 179, 143 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1978).
104. Id. at 184, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
105. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1000-1000.5.
106. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§3050-3054.
107. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 184-85, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
108. Id. at 186-87, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75.
109. Id. at 187, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
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The approach used by the court of appeal is objectionable for several
reasons. First, the court's analysis of the first Lynch prong is unprecedent-
ed. Rather than analyzing the variety of conduct and drugs that fall within
the ambit of Section 11550, the court performed a constitutional sidestep by
fabricating a process by which many offenders would be filtered away from
the mandatory minimum sentence. This was an attempt to remedy the
overbreath and singular treatment contained in the statute. The statute thus
viewed from a pragmatic stance was then seen as an appropriate means for
dealing with the much narrower issue of narcotics addiction. Nowhere has
the California Supreme Court endorsed such an analysis. Indeed, in People
v. Wingo, 110 the supreme court highlighted- the necessity of considering all
the conduct coming within the reach of a statute. In Wingo, subdivision (a)
of Penal Code Section 245111 was found to be constitutional even though it
outlawed a wide variety of conduct because "an equally wide range of
penalties" 1 2 were prescribed. Such is not the case with Section 11550
which treats all offenders in a singular fashion.
This fundamental misconstruction also flawed the court's discussion of
the penological purpose of the mandatory punishment. The court did not
even attempt to deal with the myriad of drugs and wide array of conduct
reached by this statute. Due to the hypothetical filtering process the court
constructed earlier in the opinion, it only discussed a relatively narrow
spectrum of conduct and pharmacological agents. This assertion is manifest-
ly ill-conceived. 1 13 The hard cases that demonstrate the constitutional infir-
mity of the statute were simply not addressed.114
Another objection that can be registered against the Bosco opinion, albeit
not as basic as the others, is the manner in which the court dealt with the
second prong of the Lynch test. The court merely stated that this factor
indicated that Section 11550 is constitutionally suspect. It did not examine
the issue in any depth. When the penalty provisions of other statutes in
California are considered, Section 11550 truly stands out as an isolated
instance of excessive punishment. 115 The summary treatment of this issue by
the court of appeal eviscerated a great deal of the impact of this factor.
Although not mentioned in conjunction with its application of Lynch, the
court ended its discussion of the cruel or unusual punishment argument by
expressing a reluctance to declare a 90-day penalty unconstitutional:
No case has been called to our attention holding a one-year
minimum to be cruel or unusual punishment ....
110. 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975).
111. Assault with a deadly weapon or with force likely to produce great bodily injury.
112. 14 Cal. 3d at 174, 534 P.2d at 1005-06, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
113. See text accompanying notes 68-74, supra.
114. The court's approach to the first Lynch test appears to have stood the doctrine of
"unconstitutionality as applied" on its head. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886).
115. See text accompanying notes 86-99, supra.
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In our opinion the 90-day mandatory minimum is simply not so
excessive or grossly disproportionate or for such a substantial
period of time as to shock the moral sense of the people. Even
though we may philosophically or personally oppose mandatory
punishments, we cannot say that 90 days does not meet generally
accepted standards of decency. We are not authorized to simply
convert our own views of what is wise policy into constitutional
law. 116
This reservation, although containing some surface appeal in its reliance
on judicial restraint, is ultimately unavailing. The notion that the legislature
may escape constitutional scrutiny by limiting an assigned penalty to one
year does not comport with history or constitutional theory. As was shown
above, the English antecedent of the limitation on punishment was extreme-
ly sensitive, reaching even fines. 117 Furthermore, the trend of modern
American constitutional law, although at first halting, is again in this
direction.11 8
This reluctance may be a possible explanation for the manner in which the
Bosco court applied the Lynch criteria. Since a straightforward application
of Lynch would have dictated what the court considered to be an unwarrant-
ed invalidation of a "short" sentence, perhaps the test was modified to save
the statute. Whatever the reason for the approach adopted by the court, it is
submitted that it is unsound both from a historical and theoretical viewpoint.
CONCLUSION
Although the legislature generally acts with a great deal of circumspection
when it considers sentencing issues, in a few instances it has exercised its
power in an arbitrary fashion. The mandatory minimum sentence provision
of California Health and Safety Code Section 11550 is an example of the
latter type of legislative behavior. The legislature has recently devoted
considerable attention to sentencing issues. While these elected representa-
tives are involved in this area, they should reexamine both the wisdom and
constitutionality of the mandatory nature of the minimum sentence
contained in Section 11550. If the statute were redrafted to allow the
sentencing judge to consider whether the minimum sentence is warranted in
a particular case a major defect of the statute would be remedied.
In lieu of corrective legislative action, the judiciary, as custodian of the
state charter should act to strike down the mandatory aspect of the sentence.
The California Supreme Court has fashioned a set of criteria to be used to
determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime, and
116. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 189-90, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
117. See text accompanying notes 7-17, supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 18-39, supra.
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thus unconstitutional. Although the court of appeal was recently called upon
to apply these standards to Section 11550, it failed accurately to analyze the
issue using the supreme court guidelines. The reasoning of the court in
Bosco v. Justice Court is thus unpersuasive and this issue should be
reconsidered by another appellate court.
